Website fingerprinting based on TCP/IP headers is of significant relevance to several Internet entities. Prior work has focused only on a limited set of features, and does not help understand the extents of fingerprint-ability. We address this by conducting an exhaustive feature analysis within eight different communication scenarios. Our analysis helps reveal several previously-unknown features in several scenarios, that can be used to fingerprint websites with much higher accuracy than previously demonstrated. This work helps the community better understand the extents of learnability (and vulnerability) from TCP/IP headers.
State-of-the-art: Limited Set of Features
Several studies have demonstrated the ability to fingerprint websites in different scenarios, including when complete access to TCP/IP header fields is available [5] [6] [7] [8] , when the IP addresses are anonymized [9] , when virtual tunnels are used to hide information about TCP sub-flows [6, [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , when anonymization overlays like Tor are used [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] , and when packet sizes are padded [11, 14, [27] [28] [29] . Using machine learning techniques with informative features like packet sizes and sizes of consecutive burst of packets, for instance, these studies have achieved high accuracy in fingerprinting from a closed set of popular websites.
While quite illuminating, these studies answer our key question in only anecdotal ways. They focus heavily on only a handful of tried-and-tested informative TCP/IP features-when one study demonstrates that a feature like packet sizes is quite informative [11, 12] , others come along with techniques to specifically camouflage packet sizes [14, [27] [28] [29] [30] . By focusing on only a limited set of features, prior work does not help us understand the "extents" of learn-ability (and vulnerability) from TCP/IP headers-what is the list of all TCP/IP features that are informative for website fingerprinting? If some of these features are camouflaged, are there others that can still be informative enough? How effective are they?
Our Approach: Exhaustive Feature Analysis (in Diverse Scenarios) In this paper, we make and test two claims. The first is that there are numerous features that can be derived from the TCP/IP headers of web traffic, and it is important to analyze these exhaustively in order to understand the extents of website fingerprint-ability. The second is that the most informative features-of-interest are likely to change, when some parts of the TCP/IP structure are hidden (e.g., in VPN or Tor tunnels). We evaluate these claims by: 1. Extracting a comprehensive list of TCP/IP features; 2. Considering eight different communication scenarios (which differ in access to TCP/IP information); 3. In each scenario, identifying and analyzing informative features and evaluating their efficacy in website fingerprinting.
Our analysis validates both claims. We discover several previously-unknown features that can be used to fingerprint websites in different communication scenarios, of-ten with much higher accuracy than previously shown. Our findings emphasize the importance of exhaustive feature analysis in developing a true understanding of the limits of learn-ability from Internet traffic. In the rest of this paper, Section 2 summarizes prior work on website fingerprinting. Section 3 presents our data collection and analysis methodology. Sections 4-9 analyze the most informative features and evaluate their performance in different communication scenarios. We summarize concluding remarks in Section 10. Table 1 . Summary of prior work evaluated in this paper (including communication scenario, feature set, and classifier). Note that "*" indicates the author did not specify the property.
Author
Scenario Features Classifier Liberatore (L) [11] SSH packet size count Naive Bayes Herrmann (H) [12] SSH, Tor packet size frequency Multinomial Bayes Panchenko (P) [18] SSH, Tor size markers, HTML markers, # markers, percentage incoming packets, occurring packet sizes, transmitted bytes, # of packets SVM Dyer (Vng++) [14] SSH per-direction bandwidth, total time, burst markers Naive Bayes Wang (FLSVM) [21] Tor Tor cell instances Distance-based SVM Feghhi (DTW ) [ [33] Tor packet ordering, concentration of outgoing packets, # of Random Forests packets per second, inter-arrival time, transmission time Trevisan (T ) [7] HTTP server IP address count, hostname count *
Challenges and Goals
An exhaustive analysis of all features is an unusual machine learning task. There are several challenges that must be addressed: -The first step is to exhaustively list all features-we believe this is infeasible, given that the infinite possible feature combinations (and statistical derivatives) can not be manually listed. Instead, we pursue the more modest goal of comprehensively listing semantically-relevant groups of features (Section 3.2). -The large list of features will necessarily contain several features that are correlated. The existence of interdependent features have three potential sideeffects: possibility of over-fitting [36] , curse of highdimensionality [37] , and (most relevantly) misleading interpretation of feature importance. Although dimensionality-reducing algorithms such as Principal Component Analysis may help get rid of correlated features, they do not let us understand feature importance, which is the main focus in our work. Our next goal is to derive a comprehensive list of important features that are not correlated (Section 3.4). -There are several communication scenarios used widely in the Internet today that conceal some TCP/IP features (e.g., the use of encrypted tunnels hides all TCP sub-flow information). It follows that features that are informative in one scenario may not be as revealing in others-e.g., packet size distribution has been shown as as a powerful feature in encrypted tunnels; however, this is not the case in Tor since all packets are padded to a fixed length. In order to truly understand the extents of website fingerprint-ability, we repeat our comprehensive feature analysis under a diverse set of prominent communication scenarios (Section 3.3).
Innovations This paper presents two key innovations. First, it defines and considers several communication scenarios and performs a comprehensive feature importance analysis in each. Second, it evaluates the efficacy of the newly-discovered informative features in accurately fingerprinting websites (by comparing with prior work). We believe such a comprehensive analysis is an important first step in two seemingly-competing directions-aiding legitimate entities in robustly fingerprinting under different communication scenarios, and aiding security researchers in designing fool-proof countermeasures against website fingerprinting.
Methodology

Data Collection Methodology
Website Downloads The website dataset used in this paper is collected by visiting the landing page of the top 3,000 worldwide websites listed on Alexa [38] . Each website is visited 20 times using Google Chrome Version 61.0.3163.100 (cache disabled) on a desktop machineSelenium webdriver is used for web browser automation. 5 When visiting a website, we set a 20s time-out before closing the Chrome browser-pages that fail to load within this period will be marked as a failure. 6 A successful visit is defined as an instance. In total, we successfully visited 2,712 websites at least once within 20s. The total number of instances was 44,944.
Website Labels Since the focus of this work is website fingerprinting, we use the domain name that appears in 5 https://github.com/SeleniumHQ/selenium/ 6 We use set_page_load_timeout(time_to_wait) provided by Selenium; pages that fail to be completely loaded within time_to_wait will throw an error. These are either invalid URLs or too slow to load. 
Feature Engineering
In machine learning, powerful features are defined in order to make explicit certain implicit characteristics of data. In this section, we summarize the different types of features we extract from TCP/IP headers. We group our features into five levels-examples of feature categories in each level are presented in [39] [40] [41] . In this work we consider features related to the usage of different port numbers as well as the amount of traffic to/from port 443 (HTTPS) and 80 (HTTP) in a traffic trace. We define 7 semanticallydifferent feature categories in this level. 5. IP address-level. Server IP addresses and hostnames have been used previously for website fingerprinting [7] . We extract related features by calculating the frequency with which different server IP addresses and hostnames (derived from reverse-DNS lookups) 9 are contacted for a webpage download, as well as the amount of traffic to/from different IP addresses and hostnames. We define 20 semanticallydifferent feature categories in this level.
8 For packet direction, positive sign ('+') is used to represent incoming packets that sent from servers to clients while negative sign ('-') indicates outgoing packets sent by clients. Thus the range of packet size is [-1500, 1500], with a maximum transmission unit (MTU) of 1500. 9 The hostnames were derived after completion of the 20 download instances of the websites, which boils down to a gap of a few days for some websites. Hostnames can be more reliable when the gap is smaller.
Overall, we extract around 35,683 features, that can be grouped into 109 feature categories, from the TCP/IP headers of a web page download traffic.
Feature Reduction/Preprocessing High-dimensional feature spaces may be affected by huge computation cost and the curse of dimensionality problem in machine learning [37] . In order to control the number of features for feasible analysis, we performed each of the following preprocessing steps. Most of these are motivated by prior literature-details of experimental evaluations can be found in [42] : 1. Packets without payload (ACK packets) are removed from each instance-this not only aids in extracting burst-level features but also improves the classification accuracy [18, 20] . 2. Packet size is rounded off to an increment of 8, while burst size is rounded off to an increment of 600-these values are obtained through experimental evaluations and help manage the tradeoff between controlling the number of features and information loss caused by rounding off. 3. For IP addresses, only the first three bytes of IP addresses are considered, and for hostnames, only the second-level domain names are considered-this helps control the number of features as well as improve robustness when multiple servers are used for the same service.
Communication Scenarios Considered
It is important to note that not all of the features identified in Section 3.2 may be available for a given webpage download. Indeed, due to increasing reliance on privacyenhancing mechanisms, several features in all five levels (packet-level to IP address level) may be unavailable in reality. In this section, we identify eight different scenarios (summarized in 
Identifying Informative Features
The main goal of this paper is to identify all types of features that are notably informative for website fingerprinting in a given communication scenario. Given the large number of features we are considering (35,683), we believe this step needs to be guided by prudence. Our list of features is certain to contain several features that are highly correlated to each other. To realize our goal, it is important to select features that are not only highly informative, but are also uncorrelated to each other. For each communication scenario, we achieve the above using the following three steps: 1. Filtering out less important features: We first calculate the importance of each feature for the task of website fingerprinting. For this, we use Extra-Trees [44] from scikit-learn [45] , with max_features= √ # of f eatures and entropy [46] as the "impurity" criterion, to measure the Mean Decrease Impurity (MDI) importance [47] . 12 We use cross-validation to determine number of trees in the forest (n_estimators). The larger the MDI importance, the more informative the feature is. 13 Our goal is to use the importance score to filter out features that are not important. 12 We use Extra-Trees instead of Random Forest [48] to calculate MDI, since the former has been shown to be more computationally efficient and requires less memory-with comparable classification performance [44] . 13 MDI importance has been used widely in gene selection [49] [50] [51] as a screening procedure for identifying important features.
Theoretically, MDI importance of a feature is equal to 0 if and only if the feature is irrelevant with totally randomized trees [47] . However, MDI-based importance scores may be biased in the presence of correlated features [52] : as the number of correlated features increases, the MDI for each individual inter-dependent feature decreases-this may mislead our importance analysis. Identifying and removing correlated features is not feasible for such a large feature space. Instead, we rank features according to their importance score and select the first n features that contribute to 99% of the total MDI of the feature list. 14 This filtering step leads to a huge reduction in the number of features-e.g., 5,852 important features in S0 (see Table 4 ). In the second step below, we remove correlated features.
Removing correlated features:
We next cluster together correlated features and choose one representative feature from each cluster. For clustering, we first normalize features to zero mean and one standard deviation and compute the Euclidean distance between each feature pair. We then perform average-linkage hierarchical agglomerative clustering [53] based on Euclidean distance by using AgglomerativeClustering in scikit-learn. To select the optimal number of clusters, we consider both supervised and unsupervised approaches-both yield consistent results, so we focus on the latter since it has a much lower computation cost. We evaluate the "goodness" of each clustering scheme based on average silhouette scores [54, 55] : the higher the value, the better the clustering scheme. After finding the optimal clusters for grouping correlated features, we select the feature with the maximum MDI importance from each cluster. With this, our final feature list is reduced to only relevant and uncorrelated features (Table 4) . We feed this list into Extra-Trees, to re-compute the MDI importance for each feature without correlation bias.
Grouping semantically-similar features: In contrast
to [33] , we do not focus on analyzing the importance of each fine-grained feature (such as the maximum packet size and median packet size) in a traffic trace. Instead, we focus on ranking the importance of features with different semantics-defined according to the 109 semantically-similar feature categories in Section 3.2. We believe that this is prudent given the goal of this paper-it is more informative to understand which feature category (such as number of packets per TCP, packet size count, or initial 30 packets) is important for website fingerprinting, rather than which statistical derivatives of a feature category is more important. Indeed, when a camouflaging technique is adopted, it is likely to hide all features within a feature category (such as padding each packet to a fix value in the traffic, rather than merely trying to cover the maximum packet size). Thus given the final feature list, we group features according to their semantically-defined feature category, and use summation of the weight of features within a group as the metric to measure importance of each category of features. 15 Arguably, the order of the first two steps should be changed-first remove redundancy and then filter out less important features. However, the cost for computing distance between all feature pairs is O(mn 2 ), while the cost for building a decision tree is O(nmlgm), where n is the number of features and m refers to size of training samples. For computation efficiency, we prefer to calculate the MDI importance first.
Stability of Feature Selection
To verify the stability of our feature selection methodology, we repeat the above procedure 30 times for each communication scenario-in each iteration, we randomly choose 2,000 websites with 16 instances from our dataset. We compute the standard deviation (across all iterations) in the importance of each feature category in the final list.
15 The semantically-similar category here is different from the correlated groups identified in step 2. There may be correlated features across semantically-defined feature categories, and there may be uncorrelated features within a given category.
The overall standard deviation is around 0.1%, which demonstrates the consistency of the selected features.
In what follows, we use the above methodology in each communication scenario. Due to space constraints, we only summarize the results for some scenarios (S1, S3 and S5 )-details are included in [42] .
Baseline: HTTPx Transfers (Full TCP/IP Headers)
To begin with, we consider the most common scenario of visiting webpages using HTTPx transfers, including HTTP/1.x, HTTP/2.0, and HTTPS, without using enhanced privacy technologies. Although advanced technologies are available, a majority of Internet users do not use them due to either lack of privacy concerns or accessibility issues (several countries block VPN and advanced anonymization networks such as Tor due to legislation issues). 16 Thus, complete access to TCP/IP headers is available for website fingerprinting.
Related Work Website fingerprinting using HTTPx traces has been considered in previous studies [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , using different types of features. In the earliest work, Sun et al. used HTTP object counts and sizes to identify a website using statistical techniques based on the Jaccard coefficient [5] . Macia et al. extracted and used the size and position of the root file and objects corresponding to a given web page [9] . [7] . The maximum number of wegpages considered across these prior work is 2,000, and the reported classification accuracy ranges from 50%-90%. Although prior work has achieved high fingerprinting accuracy with HTTPx transfers, performance is expected to degrade as more websites are considered for classification [14] . An exhaustive feature analysis helps understand whether there are additional features that are significantly informative. We do this analysis next. Table 5 17 lists the feature categories (ranked by importance) identified for this scenario using the methodology of Section 3.4-note that these are categories, and include statistical derivatives and finer-granularity features. Feature categories that have not been discovered by prior work are: 18 1. Transmitted bytes per TCP conn., w.r.t. top 20 most common hostnames and server IP addresses. Due to the influence of big players [56] in the Internet, more content is now being served using shared infrastructure such as Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and cloud computing platforms. These two feature categories are defined with respect to the top 20 most commonly visited server hostnames and IP addresses in our dataset, 19 and indicate: (i) whether a website uses services provided by prominent providers, such as Akamai, Google and Facebook, to serve their content, and (ii) how much data is served from each of these (which may differ across websites). We find that these categories are fairly informative. We also find that hostnames identify a service more reliably than IP addresses-indeed, the latter may vary across visits and across client locations. 2. Cumulative packet sizes with/without direction. These feature categories are based on the sum of the first n packet sizes, with n ranging from 1 to 100. For example, given a packet sequence of [-100, 100, -70], the first 3 cumulative packet sizes are [100, 200, 270] and the first 3 cumulative packet sizes with direction are [-100, 0, -70]. These two feature categories capture a wealth of information on packet sizes, cumulative burst sizes, request/response ordering/direction. While these categories are less intuitive than simply examining packet sizes and burst sizes, our analysis reveals that they can be quite informative for website fingerprinting. 3. Number of bursts per TCP connection. These feature categories are based on number of bursts observed within each TCP connection, including incoming and outgoing bursts. Among them, the most important one is ratio of incoming bursts per TCP connection. Normally, the ratio should be 0.5, given 17 Tables of important features are truncated in this paper due to space limitation. Complete tables are included in [42] . 18 Features that have been identified in prior work will not be discussed here due to space limitation. 19 A list of 20 most common server IP addresses and hostname in our dataset can be found at the end of Appendix 11.
New Informative Features
the expected request and response communication pattern between clients and servers. However, variations may arise from: (i) the tail of a traffic trace getting truncated during data collection (which affects TCP connections that require more time to finish); or (ii) the server failing to receive the last request or the client failing to receive the last response due to congestion; In either case, the ratio of incoming bursts may change from 0.5 to n 2n−1 , where 2n − 1 is total number of bursts observed. 4 . Ratio of incoming bytes per TCP connection. This feature category is based on the ratio of incoming bytes to the total bytes sent in each TCP connection. This is likely to be influenced by both content (length) on a website (which determines the response sizes) and the transfer protocol configuration for application data (which determines the request sizes). Other categories related to transmitted bytes per TCP connectionincluding total/incoming/outgoing bytes per TCP connection-are also informative (cumulative importance of 2.23). 5. Initial packets in first TCP connection. This feature category includes the size and direction for the first 30 packets transmitted within the first TCP connection. While a similar feature has been used for Tor traffic analysis, it has not been used before for HTTPx analysis [22] . When visiting a website using HTTP/1.x, the first TCP connection carries the base page (index.html), whereas subsequent TCP connections fetch embedded objects. The base page typically describes the template of the website and the placement of different objects-which are more stable than the content (or the embedded objects Table 5 . For comparison, we also classify websites using feature sets used in prior work (Table  1 )-for completeness, we also include feature sets that have been used in (only) other communication scenarios. In order to control for performance variations due to the use of different machine learning algorithms by different prior work, we focus only on the feature sets they use and apply the same classifier (Extra-Trees) on top of each feature set. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the evaluations are conducted using data from 2,000 websites, each with 16 instances. We perform 10-fold crossvalidation to obtain average accuracy. The results are summarized in Table 6 (our feature set is denoted as Wfin). We find that: -As can be seen, classifiers with packet size count as features (H, L and P) outperform classifiers designed for Tor, including CUMUL and k-FP, since packet sizes are fixed in Tor and not considered as informative for classification. FLSVM that treats packets as a sequence and performs classification based on the edit distance between each pair of sequences is also able to achieve a high accuracy since it utilizes both packet size and ordering-however, it imposes a huge computation cost for calculating the distance between a test sequence and each training sequence. A high accuracy achieved with T further confirms that server IP address and hostnames can be quite informative for website fingerprinting [7] . -Our feature set achieves the highest classification accuracy. However, since the distribution of packet size alone is quite informative for identifying a website in S0, our feature set performs only somewhat better (1.8%) compared to the best-performing feature set used in prior work (L) [11] . Nonetheless, our analysis helps discover several other informative features that are quite powerful. Why Extra-Trees? For deciding which machine learning classifier to use in the evaluations above, we considered SVM [57] , k-NN and Extra-Trees. The classification accuracy achieved with Extra-trees was, on average, about 15% higher than that achieved with k-NN using our dataset. Compared to SVM, Extra-Trees was also more computationally efficient and consumed less memory with the large number of features we consider. Appendix 12 also includes evaluations of the state of the art using classifiers used in the original work.
Evaluation of Scenario S1 Our evaluations of HTTPx traces with anonymized IP addresses yielded informative features similar to S0 and offered similar classification performance (Table 6 )-detailed evaluation results are included in the extended version in [42] . Compared to S0, we also note the increased importance of features related to the inter-arrival time between subsequent packets (inter-arrival times of first 20 incoming/outgoing packets). These features are affected by object sizes and the number of parallel TCP connections initiated within encrypted tunnels.
Classification Accuracy Gains
We next evaluate the classification accuracy yielded by the newly discovered features, and compare it to features used in prior work (Table 6 ). Since encrypted tunnels do not hide actual packet size, performance of classifiers that use packet size count as features, including H, L and P, remains the same. With TCP sub-flows being hidden, accuracy achieved with Vng++ [14] reduces significantly from 79.90% to 15.61%-such a significant drop is mainly due to the decrease of importance of burst size count in encrypted tunnels. Overall, accuracy achieved with the best-performing features from the state-of-the-art (L), which uses raw packet size count as features, is only somewhat lower compared with Wfin (around 1.3%), which further validates the informativeness of packet size for website fingerprinting. Evaluation results with other datasets are included in Section 12.1.
Padding-based Camouflaging
The distribution and sequence of packet sizes has been demonstrated as one of the most informative features for website fingerprinting in both prior work [11, 12, 14, 18] and our work. In this section, we consider padding-based privacy-enhancing techniques that hide actual packet sizes. We evaluate these both within HTTPx transfers as well as encrypted tunnels. In addition, we examine the influence of techniques that camouflage inter-packet arrival times between consecutive padded packets.
PadToMTU
We first start with HTTPx transfers and study what features are most informative for website fingerprinting when PadToMTU is used (S3:S0+PadToMTU ). Due to space limitation, detailed analysis is presented only in [42] . The main finding is that when packet sizes are hidden, importance of other feature categories increases, such as initial packets in first TCP connection and transmitted bytes w.r.t. server IP addresses. Notably, two burst-level feature categories gain importance in this scenario: burst duration and number of packets in a burst count. In terms of classification accuracy, Wfin outperforms the best performing feature set from the state-of-the-art by around 10%.
Encrypted Tunnel + PadToMTU
The next scenario we consider (S4:S2+PadToMTU ) resembles Tor, since: (i) all packets are padded to a fix size, and (ii) IP addresses, port numbers, and TCP subflows are all hidden in TCP/IP headers, which is characteristic of Tor due to onion routing. Tor [16] aims at protecting users' surfing activities from eavesdropping by routing data through several relay nodes, as well as using layered encryption of the content. It has been regarded as one of the most secure networking technology with more than 2 million current daily users [3] consequently, it has received a lot of attention in traffic analysis literature in the past few years.
In S4, only limited information from packet-level and burst-level is available and we extract around 7,600 initial features (Table 4) for importance analysis to understand whether there are other features that can be used for website fingerprinting when actual packet size is camouflaged within encrypted tunnels.
Related Work Tor traffic analysis has received a lot of attention and several informative features have been identified in prior research. Murdoch et al. showed that an attacker with control over both-ends of a Tor connection can compromise the client's privacy by analyzing timing characteristics [17] . Panchenko et al. used packet size count and several additional features, such as total transmitted bytes and HTML Marker, with Support Vector Machines (SVM) [18] . Yu et al. took a fundamentally different approach by utilizing browsing time intervals to infer the length of web page and managed to identify 1,000 accessed pages using a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and the Viterbi algorithm [19] . Cai et al. employed the size and direction of packets as features along with distance-based SVM [20] . Based on Cai et al. [20] , Wang et al. focused on cell as a unit of data (rather than TCP/IP packets) with 100 websites, to define a new metric for characterizing the similarity between two traffic instances [21] . Apart from general size and timing features, Wang et al. added several features, such as concentration of outgoing packets and packet ordering, to identify 100 monitored web pages with k-NN [22] . Panchenko et al. combined four basic features identified in [18] together with features extracted from cumulative sum of packet sizes for analyzing 100 websites using Tor [23] . More recently, based on comments made by Juarez et al. [60] , Wang et al. attempted to remove assumptions made in previous website fingerprinting and gap the bridge between laboratory setups and realistic conditions [24] . Finally, Abe et al. [25] and Rimmer et al. [26] investigated the application of deep learning for website fingerprinting in Tor traffic. 
New Informative Features
Classification Accuracy Gains
We evaluate the website classification accuracy achieved using the newly discovered features, and compare it to features used in prior work (Table 6 ). With packet size being camouflaged in encrypted tunnels, classification accuracy of classifiers that use burst size as features (P and Vng++) is further decreased. In this case, Wfin still outperforms the best-performing feature sets from the state-of-theart by around 9%. Furthermore, the overall classification accuracy of Wfin is only slightly lower than that achieved in S2 -this indicates that despite the absence of the powerful features related to packet sizes, our analysis methodology helps uncover several other features that are collectively nearly as informative.
Encrypted Tunnel + PadToMTU + Fixed IAT Our evaluation of scenario S5:S4+FixedIAT yields similar classification performance as S4 (see Table 6 )-detailed evaluation results are included in [42] .
Unidirectional Traffic Headers
In some cases, incoming and outgoing traffic may be routed through different links between client and server due to asymmetric routing or security concerns (e.g., [61] [62] [63] ). Thus, only the incoming or outgoing traffic may be accessible on the link being monitored. We next consider the scenarios with only incoming (S6:S0+Incoming Only) and outgoing (S7:S0+Outgoing Only) HTTPx traffic available and study website fingerprinting with features derived from unidirectional traffic headers. Note that while incoming traffic contains responses sent from servers to clients for displaying objects on a website, outgoing traffic contains the requests from clients to servers and reveals the length of url associated with each object. In prior work, Feghhi et al. demonstrated the efficiency of using uplink time information of packets for website fingerprinting [15] . However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work that studies/targets website fingerprinting in unidirectional scenarios.
Incoming Traffic Only
Informative Features [22] and compare Wfin with one of the state-of-the-art classifiers-k-FP [33] . This dataset is composed of 100 monitored web pages, each with 90 instances, and 8,900 non-monitored websites each with a single instance. With the same experimental setup as in [33] , the classifier is trained on 60 instances for each of the 100 monitored web pages and 3500 unmonitored web pages, and the client can browse to any of those monitored web pages or to 5,000 unmonitored ones. The aim of the classifier is to determine whether the client is visiting one of the monitored web pages and establish which one. Since the dataset is imbalanced, the performance is measured in terms of true positive rate 21 (TPR), false positive rate 22 (FPR), and bayesian detection rate 23 (BDR), and is shown in Table 10 : Wfin is able to correctly classify a monitored web page 92% of the time (compared to 88% with k-FP). Table 10 . Open-world performance (%) of k-FP and Wfin with Wang et al. dataset [22] . 
Recent Countermeasures
Several countermeasures have been proposed over the past decade to camouflage informative features such as packet sizes. We next evaluate the performance of Wfin in the presence of several of these, including traffic morphing [30] , Decoy [18] , BuFLO [14] , Tamaraw [28] and Walkie-Talkie [31] . It is important to note that the Wfin features used in this section are the same as those that were derived in the corresponding scenarios in Sections 4-7-Wfin has not been re-derived with these new countermeasures in place. In [42] , we include evaluations that show that the classification performance obtained using the above approach matches that obtained when Wfin is rederived with the BuFLO countermeasure.
Our Dataset
Encrypted Tunnel (S2) First, we evaluate the performance of Wfin against countermeasures with 2,000 websites from our dataset in S2 and compare with CU-MUL and k-FP, which are two state of the art classifiers. The outcomes are shown in Table 11 . As can be seen, Wfin outperforms both CUMUL and k-FP in face of countermeasures due to its high diversity in the feature set. The difference ranges between 0.2% to 20%. Encrypted Tunnel + PadToMTU (S4) We evaluate performance of Wfin against countermeasures in S4 and display the outcomes in Table 12 . Wfin still outperforms both CUMUL and k-FP and the gap falls between 0.5% to 7%. 
Wang et al. Tor Dataset [22]
Next, we compare performance of Wfin and k-FP against four types of countermeasures shown in Table  13 in both closed-world and open-world scenarios with the Tor dataset [22] .
Closed-world Scenario
In closed-world scenario, we use 90 instances from each of the 100 monitored web pages for training and testing with 10-fold cross validation. In general, Wfin outperforms k-FP in face of countermeasures due to its high diversity in feature types. The most efficient countermeasure is Tamaraw [28] , which aims at hiding packet size and ordering by sending packets in fixed size and injecting junk packets. Table 14 . In face of BuFLO, Wfin is able to correctly classify a website 24% of the time, while k-FP is able to correctly classify with 5% probability. In the worst case against Tamaraw, Wfin still outperforms k-FP around 8% in terms of TPR. Overall, Wfin is able to achieve higher TPR, lower FPR and higher BDR in face of different countermeasures in open-world scenario compared with k-FP. 
Walkie-Talkie [31]
Finally, we evaluate the performance of Wfin and k-FP against a fairly recent countermeasure-Walkie-Talkie [31]-with two Tor datasets collected by Wang et al. [31] in open-world scenario (shown in Table 15 ). The experimental setup is the same as in previous sections and the datasets consist of 100 websites, each with 100 instances, and 10,000 websites each with one instance. 24 Without Walkie-Talkie, Wfin outperforms k-FP by around 7% in terms of TPR. The gap is further increased to 15% with the Tor dataset protected by Walkie-Talkie. 
Discussion & Conclusions
In this paper, we conduct an exhaustive feature importance analysis in eight different communication scenarios for website fingerprinting. Using a careful methodology for listing, reducing, grouping, and evaluating fea- 24 The reason why we do not evaluate Walkie-Talkie in our dataset and Wang et al. [22] dataset is because Walkie-Talkie requires browsers to work in half-duplex mode and both datasets are collected in the normal full-duplex mode.
tures, we (i) discover several previously-unknown informative feature categories, and (ii) outperform the features used in the state of the art with the feature set derived from our methodology across all eight communication scenarios. More specifically, by analyzing the importance of different feature categories across all scenarios, we discover the following: -When available in HTTPx (S0/1 ), encrypted tunnel (S2 ) and unidirectional scenario (S6/7 ), features derived from actual packet size alone, such as packet size count and unique packet size, are informative enough to achieve comparable performance with state of the art. -Although the importance of server IP addresses and hostnames has been partially revealed in previous studies [7, 8] Thus, an open question for this paper is how will caching impact feature importance. One speculation is that the relative importance of each feature category will change while the overall ranking remains stable. It is also worth noting that the influence of caching depends strongly on the time gap between consecutive visits to a web page-this adds diversity to real world traffic, which must be incorporated in training and testing conditions. -Diverse browser platforms. There is significant diversity in the browser platforms used by Internet clients. It is important to study the influence of browsers on website fingerprinting-especially when the browsers platforms used in the training and testing datasets are different. -HTTP/2. With the growing adoption of HTTP/2 [67] [68] [69] , features such as server push and pipelined/parallel download of objects is becoming increasingly commonplace. We speculate these new features will make website fingerprinting more challenging under the HTTPx scenario since they directly influence several of the important traffic features we have identified. Understanding this influence remains an important future work.
[68] Jawad Manzoor, Idilio Drago, and Ramin Sadre. 
Additional Evaluations
Performance with other datasets
We next use two datasets made available by prior work to study our feature selection methodology.
SSH2000 Dataset [11]
We evaluate the performance of Wfin with the data on 2,000 websites in SSH2000 [11] -for scenarios S2, S4, and S5. The results are summarized in Table 16 . As can be seen, the difference in performance of Wfin and the best-performing features from the state-of-the-art is quite significant-5.65%, 17.16%, and 20.64%, respectively, across the three scenarios. We also find that the classifiers that rely on packet size do not perform as well with this dataset (compared to our dataset). We suspect this is due to less uniqueness in packet sizes in SSH2000 (according to analysis in [11] ). On the other hand, accuracy obtained with DTW is higher in SSH2000 than with our dataset, which suggests that packet times in SSH2000 are more unique for each website. This is also supported by the 51 It computes the number of different second-level hostnames a client connects with to load a website. 52 It indicates how many TCP connections each hostname connects with to load a website. 53 We focus on transmitted bytes per TCP connection w.r.t. 20 most common hostnames in our dataset. 54 We compute the total transmitted bytes per hostname in a traffic trace and record the 20 largest value in a descending order. gap between the performance of Vng++ (which uses total transmission time as one of three features) in each dataset. When inter-arrival times are fixed (S5 ), classification accuracy obtained with features proposed in k-FP decreases from 63.13% to 54.91% with SSH2000, while in our dataset the performance gap is less than 1%. This further supports the conclusion about unique timing information in SSH2000, since k-FP uses three features extracted from packet timestamp.
Tor dataset [22]
We evaluated the performance of our classifier with a public Tor dataset provided by Wang et al. [22] , which is collected by visiting 100 websites each 90 times with Tor browser. With the informative features identified in S4, we are able to achieve an accuracy of around 92.21% with 90 instances per website (60 for training and 30 for testing) using Extra-Trees-this is comparable to the accuracy 0.91 ± 0.03 reported in [22] . Based on estimation of bayes error about samples in Tor dataset in [35] , an accuracy around 91% may be the best performance we are able to obtain with this Tor dataset in a closed-world experiment.
Influence of Classifier
In Section 4-7, we have evaluated the performance of different feature sets on classification accuracy by using the Extra-Trees classifier. In order to understand the potential impact of different machine learning algorithms on classification performance, we next evaluate classification accuracy achieved using the respective machine learning algorithm proposed in the original work. Table  18 summarizes the results. Comparing with Table 6 , two observations are worth emphasizing here: 1. Classifiers do affect classification performance. For example, with the same input data samples and features, accuracy achieved with Extra-Trees is higher in most cases, compared to Bayes classifiers such as Naive Bayes (L) and Multinomial Bayes (H ). 2. Extra-Trees does not outperform in all cases. For example, SVM, which is the original machine learning algorithm used in P, outperforms Extra-Trees in S4 and S5 (in which P performs poorly); while in other scenarios, such as S0 and S1 (in which P performs well), Extra-Trees performs better than SVM.
More fundamentally, we believe that our analysis suggests that any website fingerprinting research must separately evaluate the impact of the feature set and the machine learning algorithm being used, in order to help us better understand the improvement in the proposed work compared to others. This is especially important for prior work that combines results from either multiple layers of classifiers, or employs additional models (e.g., HMM) for improving classification performance [8, 33] .
